The Ontology of the Accident: An Essay on Destructive Plasticity

When Socrates was standing before the Athenian tribunal in 399 BC, he said in his defence that the opponents he feared most were the invisible ones, those who had been spreading rumors against him for years but none of whom were being brought to court – it was like fighting shadows. The moment was Socrates, the harbinger of logos and true knowledge, was eventually defeated by rumors and mendacious slander.

Where does the strange power of rumors come from? Everyone knows that rumors are unfounded and based on thin air, but still they pass them rumors spread, and what appeared as a small breeze can grow into a mighty whirlwind and produce serious effects, ruin people’s lives and change the course of events. This book scrutinizes the mysterious power of rumors and seeks to analyse it philosophically, examining along the way some key moments of our cultural history concerning rumors, from Shakespeare and Cervantes to Gogol and Kafka.  It also underlines the fact that, although rumors are as old as humankind, the advent of the internet and social media has raised the spreading of rumors to an entirely new level, to the point where we could speak of the rumorization of the social.  The more communication there is, the more the social fabric threatens to fall apart – and the more urgent it becomes to find strategies to counteract this.

This book argues that the psychoanalytic concept of disavowal best renders the structure underlying our contemporary social response to traumatic and disturbing events, from climate change to unsettling tectonic shifts in our social tissue. Unlike denialism and negation, disavowal functions by fully acknowledging what we disavow. Zupancic contends that disavowal, which sustains some belief by means of ardently proclaiming the knowledge of the opposite, is becoming a predominant feature of our social and political life. She also shows how the libidinal economy of disavowal is a key element of capitalist economy.

The concept of fetishistic disavowal already exposes the objectified side of the mechanism of the disavowal, which follows the general formula: I know well, but all the same, the object-fetish allows me to disregard this knowledge. Zupancic adds another twist by showing how, in the prevailing structure of disavowal today, the mere act of declaring that we know becomes itself an object-fetish by which we intercept the reality of that very knowledge. This perverse deployment of knowledge deprives it of any reality.

This structure of disavowal can be found not only in the more extreme and dramatic cases of conspiracy theories and re-emerging magical thinking, but even more so in the supposedly sober continuation of business as usual, combined with the call to adapt to the new reality. To disrupt this social embedding of disavowal, it is not enough to change the way we think: things need to change, and hence the way they think for us.

This pamphlet takes as a model Jacques Lacan’s 1964 seminar in which he presented four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, the unconscious, repetition, the transference, and the drive.[i] In a similar manner, it reflects on some key concepts that underpin the author's clinical work as a psychoanalyst with trans-identified analysands. It argues for the re-discovery of four terms that expand Lacan’s central insights and apply to the question of trans today.

The first one is that of realness and it develops Lacan’s notion of the Real as not identical with reality; realness is often used by trans persons to describe the authenticity of their gender performance for it is a supreme truth beyond any verification.

The second concept is the concept of plasticity as developed by Catherine Malabou and applied to Schreber’s case discussed by Freud and Lacan. Plasticity leads to a conversation about beauty and its function in trans discourse.

The third concept is that of the nothing articulated with a certain type of laughter, a nothing introduced by Democritus and discussed by Barbara Cassin, Alain Badiou and Madlen Dolar. Lacan famously identified the “nothing” as one of the objects of psychoanalysis. I push the analysis to the point where one can understand a wish to “not being” (as found in suicide) as leading to the goal of “being again.” The meden was deployed by Barbara Cassin in her book Lacan the Sophist, and in discussion with Alain Badiou.

Finally, the last concept is that of the clinamen or turbulence in atomic philosophy (Lucretius) and in contemporary discourse; this turbulence throws new light on the role of accidents, and how accidents can turn into destiny (tuché). The classical concepts of the clinamen and turbulence have been explored systematically by Michel Serres. This turbulence echoes with Lacan’s notion of the sinthome as a symptom that does not need to be cured but leads to a re-creation of oneself that makes life livable.

The pamphlet offers a new twist to philosophical references the author discussed in Transgender Psychoanalysis (2017). Taken together, these four clusters of concepts provide a foundation for Gherovici's thinking about psychoanalysis. She rethinks Lacan's notions of the Real, the nothing, the endless transformations of the body that pertain to plasticity, the clinamen, the death drive - all of which are shown to be key to her understanding of the trans experience as revealed in her clinical practice.

[i] Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 11: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, New York: W. W. Norton, 1998.